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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
The sole issue for the jury to determine in this case was whether Ryan Dean 
Bevard knew the four $50 bills he attempted to use at Walmart were counterfeit.  He 
testified he did not, but the jury disagreed, and found him guilty of forgery.  Mr. Bevard 
appeals from his judgment of conviction, challenging the district court’s ruling that the 
State could impeach him with both the fact and nature of his two prior felony convictions 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 609.  The district court erred in allowing the jury to 
learn about the nature of Mr. Bevard’s prior felony convictions because this information 
was more prejudicial than probative.  This Court should vacate Mr. Bevard’s conviction 
and remand this case to the district court for a new trial. 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 On June 8, 2015, Mr. Bevard attempted to purchase a Bluetooth speaker from 
Walmart using four counterfeit $50 bills.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.140, Ls.14-16; p.144, L.7 – p.145, 
L.16.)  The clerk thought the money “didn’t feel like it was supposed to” and left the 
register to “grab a money pen.”  (Tr. Vol. I, p.146, Ls.5-19.)  The clerk was away from 
the register for approximately four-and-a-half minutes.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.149, Ls.8-22.)  
Mr. Bevard remained at the register waiting for the clerk until he received a call from his 
girlfriend, also shopping in the store, who was “in a panic” because she needed to get to 
work.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.182, Ls.7-18; p.232, Ls.4-9; p.321, L.4 – p.322, L.24.)  Mr. Bevard 
left Walmart to drive his girlfriend to work and intended to return later to get his speaker.  
(Tr. Vol. I, p.322, L.9 – p.323, L.2.)  As he was driving his girlfriend to work, Mr. Bevard 
fled from police pursuit and called 911 to falsely report a shooting, hoping to divert the 
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police away from him.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.198, Ls.15-25; p.300, Ls.3-10; p.324, Ls.12-24.)  
The police were not diverted, and the pursuit ended when a police officer rammed 
Mr. Bevard’s vehicle.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.325, L.13 – p.326, L.8.)  Mr. Bevard believed the 
police were pursuing him because he had two outstanding warrants and did not have a 
driver’s license.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.326, Ls.23-24.)  Various items of drug paraphernalia were 
found in Mr. Bevard’s vehicle.  (Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”), p.4.) 
Mr. Bevard was charged by Information with forgery, making a false 911 report, 
possession of drug paraphernalia, attempting to elude a police officer and driving 
without privileges.  (R., pp.27-29.)  The State filed an Information Part II alleging 
Mr. Bevard was a persistent violator within the meaning of Idaho Code § 19-2514, 
having been convicted in Idaho of burglary in 2009 and grand theft and/or burglary in 
2008.  (R., pp.45-46.)  Mr. Bevard pled guilty to the four misdemeanors and the case 
proceeded to trial on the forgery charge.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.11, L.4 – p.12, L.19; p.115, Ls.11-
21; R., p.68.)   
Prior to trial, the State filed a notice of intent to impeach Mr. Bevard pursuant to 
IRE 609 with evidence of his prior felony convictions if he chose to testify.  (R., pp.47-
48.)  The district court held the State could impeach Mr. Bevard with both the fact and 
nature of his prior felony convictions.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.256, L.5 – p.257, L.19.)  The district 
court said: 
I believe the [S]tate should also be entitled to, and I will allow them to elicit 
what the conviction was for.  That will eliminate the jury from speculating 
about what that might have been, as well as to allow them to properly 
assess the credibility of the defendant.  I understand the defense’s point 
that they would prefer that the nature of those not be admitted, but I 
believe that the nature is relevant and I don’t believe that the nature in any 
way is too unfairly prejudicial.  I don’t think they are close enough of the 
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same crime, so to speak, that is charged in this case to make it unfair or 
overly prejudicial to allow that.   
 
(Tr. Vol. I, p.256, L.18 – p.257, L.4.)  Mr. Bevard filed a motion to reconsider, arguing 
the State should be limited to asking about the fact of his prior convictions, and not the 
nature of those convictions.  (R., pp.70-73.)  He argued the burglary and grand theft 
convictions “are too closely connected with the current charge of [f]orgery” and “there is 
a strong likelihood that the jury will consider [the prior convictions] as proof that he has a 
propensity to steal.”  (R., p.72.)  The district court denied Mr. Bevard’s motion.  (Tr. Vol. 
I, p.260, L.23 – p.274, L.25.)  The district court said it “struggle[d] with [Mr. Bevard’s 
argument] because it seems to me that the relevance of [the prior conviction] for truth 
telling is largely informed by the nature of the conviction.”  (Tr. Vol. I, p.265, L.24 – 
p.266, L.2.)  The district court recognized this case “is almost entirely made or lost on 
the credibility of the defendant’s testimony” but nonetheless concluded “the probative 
value of the nature of the prior convictions is not outweighed by the potential for 
prejudice.”  (Tr. Vol. I, p.272, Ls.22-24; p.274, Ls.19-24.) 
Mr. Bevard testified in his defense.  He was asked on direct examination about 
his prior convictions for burglary and grand theft.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.301, Ls.4-13.)  He spoke 
candidly about his criminal history and the misdemeanors he committed in this case.  
(Tr. Vol. I, p.298, L.15 – p.302, L.10.)  However, he denied knowing the $50 bills he 
used at Walmart were counterfeit.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.301, Ls.1-3.)  He testified he received 
the bills from a friend for payment of a personal debt.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.313, Ls.4-17.)   
The jury was instructed that, to find Mr. Bevard guilty of forgery, the State had to 
prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. On or about June 8, 2015, 
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2. in the State of Idaho 
3. the defendant, Ryan Bevard, 
4. with the intent to defraud Walmart, 
5. attempted to pass as true and genuine U.S. currency, knowing the 
same to be counterfeited. 
 
(R., p.104.)  The jury was instructed that the parties agreed “[t]he U.S. currency which is 
the subject of the forgery claim was counterfeited.”  (R., p.100.)  The jury found 
Mr. Bevard guilty of forgery after deliberating for almost five hours.  (R., p.114; Tr. Vol. I, 
p.402, Ls.4-20.)  Mr. Bevard then pled guilty to being a persistent violator as alleged in 
Part II of the Information.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.407, L.18 – p.408, L.9.) 
For forgery, as enhanced by the persistent violator charge, the district court 
sentenced Mr. Bevard to a unified term of fifteen years, with four years fixed.  
(R., p.115; 1/29/16 Tr., p.26, Ls.1-12.)  For making a false 911 report, the district court 
sentenced Mr. Bevard to one year in county jail, with credit for time served.  (1/29/16 
Tr., p.26, Ls.13-16.)  For the other misdemeanors, the district court sentenced 
Mr. Bevard to time served, and ordered all the sentences to run concurrently.  
(R., p.118; 1/29/16 Tr., p.26, Ls.17-25.)  The judgment was entered on February 8, 




Did the district court err in concluding the State could impeach Mr. Bevard with both the 
fact and nature of his prior felony convictions pursuant to IRE 609?     
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Concluding The State Could Impeach Mr. Bevard With Both 





The district court concluded the State could impeach Mr. Bevard with both the 
fact and nature of his prior felony convictions pursuant to IRE 609.  The district court 
erred in concluding the probative value of the nature of Mr. Bevard’s prior felony 
convictions—grand theft and burglary—was not outweighed by the potential for 
prejudice.  Mr. Bevard’s credibility was absolutely central to his defense, and allowing 
the jury to hear about the nature of his prior convictions was prejudicial considering the 
strong likelihood that the jury would consider the nature of the convictions as proof that 
Mr. Bevard had a propensity to steal, and thus knew he was passing counterfeit bills.  
This Court should vacate Mr. Bevard’s judgment of conviction and remand this case for 
a new trial. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
IRE 609(a) states:  
For the purposes of attacking a witness’s character for truthfulness, 
evidence of the fact that the witness has been convicted of a felony and 
the nature of the felony shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or 
established by public record, but only if the court determines in a hearing 
outside the presence of the jury that the fact of the prior conviction or the 
nature of the prior conviction, or both, are relevant to the witness’s 
character for truthfulness and that the probative value of admitting this 
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the party offering the witness.  
If the evidence of the fact of a prior felony conviction, but not the nature of 
the conviction, is admitted for the purpose of impeachment of a party to 
the action or proceeding, the party shall have the option to present 
evidence of the nature of the conviction, but evidence of the 
circumstances of the conviction shall not be admissible. 
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Under this rule, “the trial court must apply a two-prong test to determine whether 
evidence of [a] prior conviction should be admitted:  (1) the court must determine 
whether the fact or nature of the conviction is relevant to the witness’ credibility; and (2) 
if so, the court must determine whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs 
its prejudicial impact.”  State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 630 (1999) (citation omitted). 
“In reviewing the trial court’s decision as to the first prong concerning relevance, 
the standard of review is de novo.”  Id. (citation omitted).  “In reviewing the trial court’s 
decision as to the second prong concerning whether the probative value of the evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial impact, the standard of review is abuse of discretion.”  Id. 
(citation omitted).  When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the 
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine:  (1) whether the lower court 
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted 
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason.  State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989). 
 
C. The District Court Erred In Concluding The Probative Value Of The Nature Of 
Mr. Bevard’s Prior Felony Convictions Outweighed Their Prejudicial Impact 
 
Mr. Bevard does not challenge the district court’s determination that the fact of 
his prior convictions was relevant to his credibility.  Instead, he contends the district 
court erred in concluding the probative value of the nature of his prior convictions 
outweighed their prejudicial impact.  He asserts in this Court, as he did in the district 
court, that the State should not have been allowed to impeach him with the nature of his 
prior convictions.  (R., p.72.)  IRE 609 directs the trial court to consider possible 
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limitation of the impeachment to proof of the fact of conviction alone, thus recognizing 
that disclosure of the nature of a conviction may be unduly prejudicial.  Trial courts have 
frequently limited impeachment to proof of the fact of conviction alone, and the district 
court should have imposed that limitation here.   
In State v. Rodgers, 119 Idaho 1066 (Ct. App. 1990), aff’d, 119 Idaho 1047 
(1991), the trial court first determined the defendant’s prior conviction for murder was 
relevant to his credibility should he choose to testify in defense at his murder trial, and 
then “undertook the weighing of the probative value of this evidence against its 
prejudicial effect, as required by [IRE] 609.”  Id. at 1072-73.  “In this process the judge 
considered the impeachment value of the prior crime, the remoteness of the prior 
conviction, the witness’s criminal history, the similarity between the past crime and the 
crime charged, the importance of the witness’s testimony, the centrality of the credibility 
issue, and the nature and extent of the witness’ criminal record as a whole.”  Id. at 1073.  
The trial court concluded the jury could hear about the fact of the defendant’s prior 
conviction, but not the nature of the conviction, so as “to minimize prejudice.”  Id.  The 
Court of Appeals held this was a proper exercise of the court’s discretion.  Id. 
Similarly, in State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628 (1999), the trial court first 
determined the defendant’s prior conviction for lewd conduct was relevant to his 
credibility should he choose to testify in defense at his trial for sexual battery of a minor 
and aggravated assault.  Id. at 891.  However, the trial court limited cross-examination 
to the fact of the conviction and prohibited any reference to the nature of the conviction, 
concluding the nature of the conviction “does not add sufficiently enough to the attack of 
[the defendant’s] credibility to outweigh the prejudicial value.”  Id. at 633.  On appeal, 
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the Court held the trial court “properly applied the two-prong test in determining whether 
to admit evidence of Thompson’s prior conviction.”  Id.  It is not clear whether the Court 
would have reached the same result if the trial court had allowed cross-examination 
regarding the nature of the defendant’s prior conviction.     
Here, unlike in Rodgers and Thompson, the district court concluded Mr. Bevard 
could be impeached with both the fact and the nature of his prior convictions.  The 
district court recognized this case “is almost entirely made or lost on the credibility of the 
defendant’s testimony” but nonetheless concluded “the probative value of the nature of 
the prior convictions is not outweighed by the potential for prejudice.”  (Tr. Vol. I, p.272, 
Ls.22-24; p.274, Ls.19-24.)  The district court did not reach its decision by an exercise 
of reason.   
Courts and commentators across the United States have recognized the 
problems inherent in allowing impeachment of a defendant by evidence of a criminal 
conviction.  See, e.g., Alan D. Hornstein, Between Rock and A Hard Place: The Right to 
Testify and Impeachment by Prior Conviction, 42 Vill. L. Rev. 1, 60 (1997); Victor Gold, 
Impeachment by Conviction Evidence: Judicial Discretion and the Politics of Rule 609, 
15 Cardozo L. Rev. 2295, 2298 (1994).  The Supreme Court of Michigan analyzed 
these problems in depth in People v. Allen, 420 N.W.2d 499 (Mich. 1988), where the 
Court found that judicial interpretation of the Michigan counterpart to IRE 609 “more 
often act[ed] to the detriment of the defendant’s right to testify than to the service of the 
jury’s ability to evaluate a witness’ credibility,” and thus promulgated an amendment to 
the Michigan rule.  Id. at 502-03.  
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The Allen Court recognized “there can be little doubt that an individual with a 
substantial criminal history is more likely to have committed a crime than is an individual 
free of past criminal activity” but “in our system of jurisprudence, we try cases, rather 
than persons, and thus a jury may look only to the evidence of the events in question, 
not defendants’ prior acts in reaching its verdict.”  Id. at 503-04.  The Court concluded 
that “[i]n light of the overwhelming tendency for jurors, and even trial and appellate 
judges to misuse prior conviction evidence, it is our view that there is an overwhelming 
probability that most prior conviction evidence introduced for the purpose of 
impeachment will be considered as if it had been introduced to show that the defendant 
acted in conformity with his criminal past.”  Id. at 510 (quotation marks omitted).  The 
Court stated it was “absurd to suggest that jurors will be able to avoid improper 
consideration of a defendant’s criminal character once it has become known to them.”  
Id.   
The concerns that led the Allen Court to promulgate an amendment to the 
Michigan counterpart to IRE 609 are obvious in this case.  The district court’s ruling 
allowed the jury to learn about the nature of Mr. Bevard’s prior convictions, and it is 
“absurd” to suggest the jury considered these only as they pertained to Mr. Bevard’s 
propensity to tell the truth, despite a limiting instruction.  (R., p.107.)  The district court’s 
ruling allowed the jury to hear character evidence through the back door of 
impeachment, which was an abuse of discretion.  See Edward E. Gainor, Character 
Evidence by Any Other Name: A Proposal to Limit Impeachment by Prior Conviction 
Under Rule 609, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 762, 800 (1990) (“[T]he propensity of convicted 
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criminals to lie should not be sufficient to justify conviction by character evidence 
through the back door of impeachment.”).   
The district court did not appear to recognize that it had discretion to withhold 
from the jury the nature of Mr. Bevard’s prior convictions.  The district court said it 
“struggle[d] with [Mr. Bevard’s argument] because it seems to me that the relevance of 
[the prior conviction] for truth telling is largely informed by the nature of the conviction.”  
(Tr. Vol. I, p.265, L.24 – p.266, L.2.)  This could be said in any case involving 
impeachment by prior conviction, but IRE 609 permits a court to limit impeachment to 
the fact of conviction.   
Mr. Bevard was on trial for forgery, which is defined by statute as follows: 
Every person who, with intent to defraud another, falsely makes, alters, 
forges or counterfeits, any . . . United States currency . . . or utters, 
publishes, passes, or attempts to pass, as true and genuine any of the 
above named false, altered, forged or counterfeited matters . . . knowing 
the same to be false, altered, forged, or counterfeited, with intent to 
prejudice, damage, or defraud any person . . . is guilty of forgery.  
 
Idaho Code § 18-3601.  The district court held the State could impeach Mr. Bevard with 
the nature of his prior convictions—one of which was for grand theft, which is defined by 
statute as follows:  “A person steals property and commits theft when, with intent to 
deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or to a third person, he 
wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof.”  Idaho 
Code § 18-2403(1).  Both forgery and grand theft involve an intent to take from another.  
These crimes are similar and the prejudicial effect of allowing the jury to learn about the 
nature of Mr. Bevard’s prior convictions surely outweighed the probative value of this 
information.  See Joseph M. McLaughlin, Jack B. Weinstein, and Margaret A. Berger, 4 
Weinstein’s Federal Evidence: Commentary on Rules of Evidence for the United States 
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Courts § 609.05[3][d] at 609-42 (Matthew Bender 2d ed 2014):  (“When a prior crime 
committed by an accused criminal defendant is similar to the one with which the 
defendant is charged, the prejudicial effect of a prior conviction admitted for 
impeachment may well outweigh its probative value.  Consequently, prior convictions for 
the same or similar crimes are admitted sparingly.”). 
Counsel for Mr. Bevard raised in the district court the very real concern that the 
jury would use its knowledge of Mr. Bevard’s prior convictions for the improper purpose 
of concluding he committed forgery here—not simply to call into question his credibility.  
The district court had discretion to prevent this potential prejudice, like the courts did in 
Rodgers and Thompson, but it did not, and the jury was left with the all but impossible 
task of separating Mr. Bevard’s criminal history from the offense for which he was 
charged.  The district court abused its discretion in conducting the second part of the 




Mr. Bevard respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction 
and remand this case to the district court for a new trial. 
 DATED this 15th day of July, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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